The State of Utah v. William Ira Leon : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
The State of Utah v. William Ira Leon : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald E. Elkins; Legal Defender Association of Utah; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Leon, No. 920150 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3069
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, J 
v. : 
WILLIAM IRA LEON, : 
Defendant/Appellant,: 
Case No. 920150-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF THEFT, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. 
HARDING, PRESIDING. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 




DOCKET NO. ]°? P/^V 
R. PAUL VAN DAM ( 3 3 1 2 ) 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
DONALD E. ELIUNS 
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. OF UT. 
COUNTY, INC. 
40 S. 100 W., STE. 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney tor A{ > [.>€:.1 lant 
yn:rm< 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM IRA LEON, : 
Defendant/Appellant,: 
Case No. 920150-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF THEFT, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. 
HARDING, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
DONALD E. ELKINS 
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. OF UT. 
COUNTY, INC. 
40 S. 100 W., STE. 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I BECAUSE NO INDICTMENTS OR INFORMATIONS WERE 
PENDING AGAINST DEFENDANT ON JANUARY 2, 1991, 
WHEN HE FILED HIS FIRST NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR 
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES, HIS FILING WAS 
PREMATURE AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT INVOKE THE 
SPEEDY TRIAL PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-29-1 (1990) 
POINT II DEFENDANT'S SECOND NOTICE AND REQUEST DATED 
DECEMBER 19, 1991, WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT 
FAILED TO SPECIFY BOTH THE NATURE OF THE 
CHARGE AND THE COURT WHEREIN IT WAS PENDING, 
BOTH REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 
(1990) TO INVOKE THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO TRIAL 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989) ,. 5 
State v. Belcher. 475 P.2d 60 (Utah 1970) 7 
State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244 (Utah 1974) 7 
State v. Maoee, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 66 (Utah 
App. Sept. 8, 1992) 8 
State v. Peterson. 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991) 7, 8 
State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 (Utah 1985) 8 
State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985) 6, 9 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1991) 2 
State v. Wright. 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987) 7, 9 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) 1/2, 4-6, 8-10 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992) 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 5 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920150-CA 
v* : 
WILLIAM IRA LEON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant,: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to 
dismiss the information on the grounds that: 1) defendant's first 
Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges, dated 
January 2, 1991 and filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 
(1990) (Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners Act), was 
premature in that no indictments or informations were pending 
against defendant in this state at the time he filed his notice and 
request; or 2) defendant's second notice and request dated December 
19, 1991, though timely, failed to specify the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it was pending, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-29-1? 
The findings of the trial court will only be set aside if they 
"are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of 
imprisonment in the state prison, jail or 
other penal institution of this state, and 
there is pending against the prisoner in this 
state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or 
any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge and 
the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of 
written notice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The chronology of events pertinent to this appeal is as 
follows: 
January 2, 1991 Defendant completes a first Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charge (s) (addendum A). This is the 
notice and request referred to in 
defendant/appellant's brief as well as in 
defendant's memorandum supporting his 
motion to dismiss (R. 19)* Contrary to 
what is stated in that memorandum, the 
notice and request was not attached to 
the memo and was not made part of the 
original record on appeal.1 
1
 Defendant stipulated and the State moved to supplement the 
record with the notice and request dated January 2, 1991, pursuant 
to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2 
September 4, 1991 
December 16, 1991 
December 19, 1991 
January 3, 1992 
February 3, 1992 
Information filed (R. 1). 
Preliminary hearing; defendant bound over 
to district court (R. 10)• 
Defendant completes a second Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charge(s) (R. 21 or addendum B). This is 
the notice and request attached to 
plaintiff's response to defendant's 
motion to dismiss and transmitted to this 
Court as part of the record on appeal. 
Plaintiff's response memorandum, however, 
incorrectly refers to it as the notice 
and request of December 19, 1990 (R. 32) 
(emphasis added). 
Defendant arraigned in Fourth District 
Court (R. 12). 
Defendant files motion to dismiss the 
information (R. 15) and a memorandum in 
support of the motion (R. 17-20); 
plaintiff files a memorandum in response 
to defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 21-
33). 
In a memorandum decision, the trial court 
denies defendant's motion to dismiss on 
the grounds that defendant's request for 
disposition of pending charges is 
premature. The court also finds the 
demand deficient because it fails to 
"specify the nature of the charge in the 
Court where it is pending" (R. 34 or 
addendum C). The court does not specify 
which notice and request it is 
considering — or whether it considered 
both of them. 
Following a jury trial, defendant is found 
guilty of theft, a second degree felony, 
and sentenced to 1-15 years in prison, to 
run concurrently with time presently being 
served (R. 66). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the offense of theft are not pertinent to the 
resolution of this case. 
February 4,.1992 
February 5, 1992 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) et. seq., allows an incarcerated individual 
to have pending charges disposed of within 120 days of making a 
proper written demand to prison authorities. In this case, two 
written demands are at issue, both captioned "Notice and Request 
for Disposition of Pending Charges." The first, dated January 2, 
1991, was not made part of the original record on appeal, but is 
clearly the document to which defendant refers in his brief.2 The 
second, dated December 19, 1991, was attached as an exhibit to the 
prosecutor's memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, and was 
transmitted to this Court as part of the record on appeal. 
As to the January 1991 notice and request, at the time 
defendant filed it, there were no indictments or informations 
pending against him as a prisoner in this state. The plain 
language of the controlling statute, Utah Code Ann,, § 77-29-1(1), 
mandates, however, that there must be "pending against the 
prisoner" an "untried indictment or information" in order for the 
speedy trial provision of the statute to apply. Because no such 
indictment or information was pending at the time of defendant's 
filing, the trial court properly concluded that the notice and 
request was premature and did not serve to trigger the beginning of 
the statutes's 120 day time limit. 
As to the December 1991 notice and request, while it was 
timely, it was nonetheless deficient in that it failed to meet the 
2
 The State moved to supplement the record with this document. 
4 
dual statutory requirements of "specifying the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it is pending." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). 
Defendant's notice and request stated only that he sought "final 
disposition of any charge(s) now pending against me in any court in 
the State of Utah. Charge(s) are now pending against me in the 
court(s) of Utah County." 
The trial court's memorandum decision does not identify which 
notice and request it considered or if it considered both of them. 
However, because neither notice meets the statutory requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1), the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss the information. Defendant's 
conviction, therefore, should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE NO INDICTMENTS OR INFORMATIONS WERE 
PENDING AGAINST DEFENDANT ON JANUARY 2, 1991, 
WHEN HE FILED HIS FIRST NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR 
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES, HIS FILING WAS 
PREMATURE AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT INVOKE THE 
SPEEDY TRIAL PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
29-1 (1990). 
The rule is well-settled that "in the absence of an ambiguity, 
a statute should be construed according to its plain language." 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
Similarly, in ascertaining the legislative intent underlying a 
statute, "the best indication of legislative intent is the 
statute's plain language." id. 
5 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990) 
enumerates three conditions, all of which must be met in order to 
trigger entitlement to disposition of pending charges within 12 0 
days: 
[1.] a prisoner is serving a term of 
imprisonment in the state prison, jail or 
other penal institution of this state, and 
[2.] there is pending against the prisoner in 
this state any untried indictment or 
information, and 
[3.] the prisoner shall deliver to the 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority . . . a written demand[:] 
[a.] specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is 
pending, and 
[b.] requesting disposition of the 
pending charge. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (bracketed numbers, letters, and 
punctuation added). If all three of these conditions are met, then 
the prisoner "shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice." JTd. 
"This statutory scheme represents a legislative expression of the 
time limits that constitute a speedy public trial under the Utah 
Constitution." State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) 
(citing State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975)). 
In this case, defendant filed his first Notice and Request for 
Disposition of Pending Charge(s) on January 2, 199l.3 The 
3
 This document was not made part of the original record on 
appeal, yet is clearly the document to which defendant refers, both 
in the trial court memorandum (R. 19) and in his appellate brief 
(Br. of Appellant at 6). 
6 
information in this case, however, was not filed until September 4, 
1991. Plainly, then, at the time the notice and request was filed, 
defendant had not yet been charged and no untried indictment or 
information was pending against him. Therefore, he did not meet 
the second requirement of the statute, and the statutory right to 
demand trial on "any untried indictment or information" was not 
triggered. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 451 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Belcher, 475 P.2d 60, 61-62 (Utah 1970). 
Interpreting an earlier version of section 77-29-1, which 
provided for 90 days during which the charge(s) must be disposed 
of, rather than the present 120-day time limit, the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
This statute plainly does not apply to any 
unfiled charge. If it did so, it would simply 
have the effect of giving a prisoner a 90-day 
statute of limitations upon any crime, 
discovered or undiscovered, that he may have 
committed. The statute indicates no such 
intent and [defendant's] contention is without 
merit. 
State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (Utah 1974). Defendant's 
contention in this case is similarly without merit. 
Defendant also argues that because the prosecutor failed to 
show good cause for the delay in filing charges once defendant's 
notice and request had been filed, his motion to dismiss should 
have been granted (Br. of Appellant at 9). For this proposition, 
defendant relies on State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), a 
case in which the Supreme Court inter alia construed subparts (3) 
7 
and (4) of section 77-29-1/ Defendant's reliance on Peterson, 
however, is misplaced. In Peterson, the notice and request was 
properly filed pursuant to subpart (1). Only when that threshold 
requirement was met did the Court reach the issues presented by the 
subsequent subparts. Peterson, 810 P.2d at 422. In this case, the 
threshold requirement has not been met. 
Finally, defendant relies on State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 
(Utah 1985), a case discussing the relationship between the due 
process protections of the fifth amendment and the speedy trial 
provision of the sixth amendment in cases where the prosecutor 
delays filing criminal charges. Defendant uses that case to 
support the proposition that the prosecutor delayed filing charges 
against defendant in this case, resulting in prejudice to the 
defendant and a tactical advantage for the prosecution (Br. of App. 
at 7-8). There is no record evidence to support this contention. 
Further, it was not raised below and is, therefore, waived en 
appeal. State v. Maqee, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, 67 (Utah App. Sept. 
8, 1992). 
Here the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss based on the January 1991 notice and request because it was 
4
 Subpart (3) states that, after the written demand is 
delivered, either the prosecution or defense, for good cause shown, 
may be granted "any reasonable continuance." Subpart (4) states 
that if the matter is not brought to trial within 120 days or the 
length of the continuance and "the court finds that the failure of 
the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause . . . the court shall order 
the matter dismissed with prejudice." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) 
and (4). 
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filed prematurely and, therefore, did not invoke the speedy trial 
provision of the statute. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND NOTICE AND REQUEST DATED 
DECEMBER 19, 1991, WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT 
FAILED TO SPECIFY BOTH THE NATURE OF THE 
CHARGE AND THE COURT WHEREIN IT WAS PENDING, 
BOTH REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 
(1990) TO INVOKE THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO TRIAL 
WITHIN 120 DAYS. 
Defendant's second notice and request, dated December 19, 
1991, was timely; however, it failed to meet another statutory 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1. The third prong of the 
statute mandates that the prisoner shall deliver to the custodial 
officer in authority a written demand "specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is pending" and requesting 
disposition of the charge. Without this requirement being met, the 
statutory right to demand trial within 120 days is not invoked. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1). 
In State v. Viles, 702 P.2d at 1176, the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to allow defendant to rely on his attorney's notice of 
appearance filed with the court as the triggering mechanism for 
section 77-29-1(1)'s 120-day time period. Because the notice 
contained only a plea of not guilty and a request that defendant be 
granted a trial, the court concluded that the it "did not comport 
with the requirements of the statute, as it was not delivered to 
the warden at the state prison and did not specify the nature of 
the charge or the court where the charge was pending." Ibid. 
Accord State v. Wright, 745 P.2d at 451. 
9 
In this case, the notice and request was similarly deficient 
in that it failed to specifically identify either the nature of the 
charge or the court in which that charge was pending. The notice 
and request stated only that defendant sought "final disposition of 
any charge(s) now pending against me in any court in the state of 
Utah. Charge(s) are now pending against me in the court(s) of Utah 
County." Because defendant's second notice and request was 
statutorily deficient and could not serve to trigger the speedy 
trial provision of section 77-29-1(1), the trial court properly 
denied defendant's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Notice and Request for Final Disposition of 
Pending Charge(s), dated January 2, 1991 and filed pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) was premature because no charges were 
pending against him on that date. The notice and request, 
therefore, could not trigger the statute's guarantee of disposition 
of charges within 120 days. Defendant's notice and request of 
December 19, 1991, although timely, was statutorily deficient in 
that it failed to specify either the nature of the charge or the 
court in which it was pending, both required under section 77-29-
1(1). That notice and request, therefore, also failed to trigger 
the statutory right to disposition of charges within 120 days. For 
these reasons, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
dismiss was correct, and defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
10 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this if day of November, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the Brief of 
Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Donald E. Elkins, Legal 
Defenders Assoc, of Utah County Inc., 40 S. 100 W. Ste. 200, Provo, 





NOTICE AND RECAST FOfl DISPOSITION OF 
PENDING CHARGE (S) . 
TO: GERAin L COOK , Director , UTAH STATE PRISON. 
NOTICE 1s hereby given that I , (/Jf7lifltytXL-rv?fO 
do hereby request final disposition of any charge (s) now pending 
against me in any court 1n the State of Utah. Charges are 
now pending against me in the court ( s ) of UTAH
 f £>l—C 
County and request i s hereby made that you forward th i s notice 
to the appropriate authorities 1n that county ( s ) , together with 
such other information as required by law. 
CHARGES PENDING: AUTO THEFT, ARMED ROBBER?, BURGLARY 
Dated th is 1 ^ day of WkUJa/b'^ *&M{_-. 
U.S.Pg /97</0 
I hereby certify that 1 received a copy of the foregoing Notice 
w i s
 ^Ld. day of <lyrrf„frfrtrt7r ^ i _ -
•w1 
/ Authorized Agent / 
t- Utah State Prison ' 
Draper, Utah 
ADDENDUM B 
!' * ^ <L 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION 
OF PENDING CHARGE(S) 
TO: C. KIM THOMPSON, DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Notice is hereby given that I, UJ)i(\\C{tV{ i^^OAJ do 
hereby request final disposition of any charge(s) now pending 
against me in any court in the State of Utah. Charqe(s) are now 
pending against me in the court(s) of L/7/4H L O O I U T V 
county and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to 
the appropriate authorities in that county together with such 
information as required by law. 
Dated this 7 day of T^Cif*** 1^€^ 199j[_ 
=?
 inmate's Name USP # 
I hereby, certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing 
notice this /f&- day of j&em*vJc<_^ 199_/_ 
{ r AUTHORIZED ^ GENT 
DIO RECORD UNIT 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
FB 10/04.07 B 
ADDENDUM C 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Statt of Utah 
CAB*4A B^SMITH, Clark 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*********** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 911400609 
vs. 
WILLIAM IRA LEON, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant. 
************ 
The Court having received the defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
hereby denies such motion. The Court finds that defendant's 
request for final disposition pursuant to Rule 77-29-1 UCA was 
premature, because at the time of the filing there were no 
indictments or information pending against the prisoner in this 
state. State v. Farnsworth 519 P.2d 244 (Utah 1974). 
The Court finds further that defendant's demand was 
deficient because it did not specify the nature of the charge in 
the Court where it is pending as required by Rule 77-29-1 UCA. 
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare an order within 15 days 
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to 
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision 
has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 4th day of February, 1992. 
cc: Mark Brady, Esq. 
D. John Mussleman, Esq. 
